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Introduction
There is no consensus on how to share health data
privately. Superﬁcially this is surprising because patient
consent cries out as the obvious basis. However, on
closer inspection using patient consent as a basis is
only ethical when it is prior, informed and under-
stood, freely given and speciﬁc.1,2 Because occasion-
ally it is not possible to secure one or all of these, an
alternative to patient consent is sometimes needed.
In England and Wales access to National Health
Service (NHS) data for medical purposes (preventive
medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research, pro-
vision of care and treatment, the management of
health and social care services, informing individuals
about: their physical or mental health or condition,
the diagnosis of their condition or their care or
treatment) without patient consent is controlled by
the Patient Information Advisory Group (PIAG; In July
2008 PIAG was merged into a sub-committee of the
National InformationGovernance Board). Initially set
up by the Health and Social Care Act 2001, PIAG
control was expected to be a temporary arrangement
until patient consent was routinely sought or the
information was anonymised or pseudonymised. This
is not what has happened. Data access requests must
always be approved centrally (with applications being
considered only six times per year) regardless of whether
the data has been anonymised or pseudonymised.
This paper suggests that the data sharing problem
should be viewed through the lens of privacy breach
risk of the data and its recipient. This simultaneously
moves us forward from the status quo and minimises
the chance of harm to the patient through that data
sharing. It is hoped that privacy breach risk qualiﬁ-
cation and quantiﬁcation will form the basis of a data
sharing consensus and thus play its part in enabling
the next generation of evidence-based health beneﬁts.
ABSTRACT
Background There is no consensus on how to
share patient records privately. Data privacy con-
cepts are surveyed and a framework is presented for
the safe sharing of sensitive data. It is argued that
tailoring the data sharing to the privacy breach risks
of each project holds out the best compromise for
keeping the trust of the public and providing for the
best quality data where detailed patient consent is
not possible.
Objective To improve the protection of data by
reducing privacy breaches and thus enable appro-
priate patient data sharing without consent.
Framework Any harm arising from data sharing
must come from the data being identiﬁed, either
fully or partially. The ﬁrst step is an agreement on an
acceptable privacy breach risk. Next, proceed to
measure that risk for the proposed data when held
by a given recipient. Finally, select from a menu of
mitigation strategies (people, process and techni-
cal) to achieve acceptable risk. The framework is
tested against the current UK approach adminis-
tered by the Patient Information Advisory Group.
Discussion The hard problem of non-consented
data sharing should be divided into the easier (though
non-trivial) ones of data and recipient breach risk
measurement. Directed research in these two areas
will help move the data sharing problem into the
‘solved’ pile.
Keywords: Inference attack, medical records sys-
tems, patient data privacy
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Background
What is identity and identiﬁable data?
When some of your very personal information is
disclosed where you had not wanted it to be, it is
common to feel hurt that a little bit of yourself has
been broadcast for all to see and potentially saved for
some future time when its use may be hurtful again. It
is critical, therefore, when thinking about data sharing
to understand the extent to which someone’s self or
identity is bound up in that data.
Intuitively what other people know about you has
passed through one ormore of their ﬁve senses. In fact
that is the only way they can learn anything about you.
It follows that a working deﬁnition of ‘identity’ is the
collection (or union) of all knowable information
about you that can be recorded through the ﬁve senses.
It may seem ridiculous that hair colour is part of
your identity along with your name. Actually the colour
of your coiﬀure is simply a less selective attribute than
name, but it forms part of the wider identity that is
recognisable as ‘you’ by others.
So the extent to which your characteristics can be
recorded and replayed determines the extent to which
that replay imitates you. Someone with a likeness to
you will fool a casual acquaintance. Someone with a
likeness to yourmannerisms, vocal patterns, approach
to problem solving and sense of humour will fool your
work colleagues. Alternatively, a remote browser trans-
action will appear to be from you if it supplies the
correct passwords.
In our increasingly electronic world there is often
no diﬀerence between a database containing captured
personal characteristics and the actual person being
described. This makes databases of personal or indi-
vidually characteristic data (especially biometrics) quite
important and the ultimate source of privacy con-
cerns.
What someone knows combined with
what’s in the data together determine
the ability to identify that data
So how does a privacy breach occur? As forensic
criminologists say it takes people, opportunity, motive
and ability to coincide before a crime occurs. At such a
conﬂuence, breaching the privacy of a dataset requires
either the attachment of a name to each record (identity
disclosure) or the inference of some unique charac-
teristic from the set of records that contain it (attribute
disclosure), e.g. learning your neighbour has had an
abortion by observing them repeatedly attending a
clinic.
If the data carries its own protection via a sensitive
ﬁeld substitution process called pseudonymisation
(required of some National Health Service ‘secondary
use’ data by April 20093), assuming this is implemented
robustly, the easiest way to learn the identities in the
data is via an inference attack.
Examples are a general practitioner recognising
their prescribing pattern within a research dataset or
a receptionist spotting their neighbour’s unique dis-
ability during their work as a receptionist at the local
clinic. See Figure 1 for a targeted version of this attack.
Notice that the privacy attack in Figure 1 hinges on
discovering someone’s unique or characteristic patterns
within the data and not on breaking the pseudonym-
isation protection per se.
What should now be clear is that for data that has
had itsmost identiﬁable ﬁelds replaced (NHSnumber,
name, address, etc.) what someone knows and what is
in the data together determine the ability to identify
the subjects and therefore breach privacy.
Figure 1 Targeted inference attack on pseudonymous data
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Protecting data privacy
So what can be done? Intuitively any process that
makes it harder to identify someone’s unique charac-
teristics within the data is a good start. In fact this is the
approach taken by those valiant enough to attempt
both publishing and protecting sensitive data.
Broadly these solutions break down into: query
controllers,4 (summary) table de-identiﬁers and (micro)
data de-identiﬁers.5 Query controllers remove ﬁelds,
limit available queries or suppress returned results.
Table de-identiﬁers for national census oﬃces omit
outliers, shuﬄe ﬁelds amongst records, smooth or
perturb the data or suppress cells with only a few
values. Finally data de-identiﬁers use technologies
such as pseudonymisation, encryption, elision, gen-
eralisation, perturbation, ‘noise’ addition, ﬁeld shuf-
ﬂing or the creation of derived ﬁelds. These make it
harder to connect unique characteristics to a person
by generalising and blurring (losing) some of the data
to make it apply to more people.6 Privacy loves a
crowd.
The more the data is modiﬁed the less
useful it is
Unfortunately each of the above approaches suﬀers
from the same problem. Each is a general tool trying
to preserve the privacy of a dataset for an unknown
audience. It would certainly be ideal if a technical
solution such as this could be found. However, either
too much information is lost in hiding characteristics
(preserving privacy) or all individual characteristics
are not entirely hidden thus exposing a breach risk.
Rather surprisingly both query control and (sum-
mary) table de-identiﬁcation result in greater data
distortion than data level de-identiﬁcation.6 Because
releasing protected row-level data also allows for
greater analytic freedom, the remainder of this paper
will concentrate on the privacy protection of that.
Prior knowledge of a workload allows
selective data modiﬁcation without
ruining its utility
Progress can bemade if you step back from the goal of
a general de-identiﬁcation solution. By recognising
that one project needs pristine diagnosis codes but can
cope with blurred demographics (age range instead
of date of birth, region instead of postcode, etc.) for
example, it is possible to lose less important infor-
mation and still get useful results.
Diﬀerent workloads require
conﬂicting modiﬁcations
Having agreed to lose some information from the
dataset to satisfy privacy requirements for the ﬁrst
project there are nowdenuded demographics – useless
for a detailed study of those demographics. Generally
any time information from a dataset is discarded a
study somewhere will be prevented.
Not all recipients are equally
trustworthy
Is it true to say that a young, inexperienced PhD student
in a shared oﬃce will husband the patient identiﬁable
information with as much care as a more seasoned
researcher with a name and reputation to lose?
If one data recipient is more amenable to being
corrupted does that not change the level of risk of
giving them sensitive data?
A data-sharing solution must accommodate not only
the project’s need for pristine data but also the trust-
worthiness of each recipient and their hosting context.
Every general data protection
technology seems to have a weakness
Protecting identiﬁable data by pseudonymising it leaves
the data open to inference attacks (Figure 1). Protecting
that pseudonymised data from inference attacks using
‘k-anonymity’ leaves it open to background attacks.7
Protecting that data from some background attacks
using ‘I-diversity’ leaves it open to enhanced back-
ground attacks.8 Protecting that data from enhanced
background attacks using ‘t-closeness’ leaves the data
unhelpfully general.
Such a survey of the state of the art in (micro)data
de-identiﬁcation is disillusioning. For those used to
the comfort aﬀorded by well-managed encryption this
is grounds for doubting the viability of any data-sharing
initiative, however promising the upsides are – unless
you factor in the breach risk.
Summary: generally there is no one-
size-ﬁts-all-users privacy technology
for databases
A single databasewhose contents are accessed bymany
parties cannot be private for two reasons: it either
ignores privacy to ensure its contents are universally
useful and/or assumes its recipients are all equally
trustworthy.
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Corollary: individual solutions are
required for each project and each
level of trustworthiness
This analysis suggests a solution that can be retroﬁtted
to existing monolithic databases. Individually assess
each recipient’s needs and breach risks then provide
tailored data accordingly.
Framework solution
Basel II inspiration
Risk of a privacy breach is probably the best way to
determine how much eﬀort should go into protecting
shared data. The situation in banking is analogous:
since theBasel Accord of 1988 large banks havewanted
to tailor the amount of money they have to set aside in
case a loan goes bad. Basel II allowed banks to assess
their own risk provided they measured their own
operational risk (as well the usual credit and market
risks) and showed everyone how they did it.9 Risk of
failure is the best way to decide how much of a safety
net is needed. Similarly, a scientiﬁc approach to sharing
data privately has three components:
1 settle on an acceptable risk level considering the
potential harm of a breach
2 measure the privacy breach risk of a proposed
sharing scheme for each recipient, and
3 bridge any shortfall from the risk appetite by
selecting from appropriate mitigation strategies –
people, process/context and technical.
Acceptable risk level
Is it possible to have water-tight anonymisation with
no breach risk whatsoever whilst still sharing data?
Unfortunately it is not. The degree of detail necessary
for useful research always contains enough unique
personal characteristics to allow for inference attacks.
That you do not recognise those characteristics does
not prevent someone else from doing so. In other
words, the only way to ensure perfect anonymisation
is to not share any data at all. Accepting the value of
data sharing thus means accepting a degree of breach
risk. But how much of a breach risk is acceptable?
Crime is a function of people, opportunity, motive
and ability and it should be recognised that breach risk
always increases with the number of sharing parties.
Thismeans for wider sharing of health records beyond
theNHS it will be necessary to either persuade the public
to accept a higher privacy breach risk or improve
protection beyond what is currently acceptable for
sharing within the NHS.
Risk measurement
With an acceptable risk level having been determined
you must check to see how far from that goal a data
sharing proposal actually is. Given that both the data
and the recipient together determine the breach risk,
any measurement must quantify both. What is to be
measured is the risk of data being identiﬁed, either
wholly (identity disclosure) or in part (attribute dis-
closure).
How the data contributes to this overall breach risk
has been studied for identity disclosure by Skinner and
Elliot and Schlomo,10,11 and for identity and attribute
disclosure by Duncan and Lambert.12
How theorganisation contributes to theoverall breach
risk is likely to bemodelled on theway operational risk
is measured for Basel II, i.e. causation (people, pro-
cesses, systems and external factors), measurable events
and costs associated with a privacy breach.
Quasi-legal but unethical events such as a UK
holder of patient information being served with a
US ‘Patriot Act’ warrant (if they have an American
parent company) must also bemodelled alongside the
more traditional breach risks.
The end result will be a sense of how far away from
the acceptable risk level the proposed project actually is.
Appropriate mitigation
This ﬁnal step is all about picking the most appropri-
ate options from a menu of available risk mitigation
approaches to bring the breach risk of the sharing
proposal to within acceptable levels.
If your proposed project absolutely needs pristine
data then pick people and process options. Con-
versely, if what is needed is cheap and approximate
data then opt for technical de-identiﬁcation instead.
Either way a reassessment of the breach risk will tell
you if your option selection (risk mitigation strategy)
is suﬃcient.
It is likely that people and process options will be far
more expensive to deploy than technical de-identiﬁ-
cation. Also sharing fully identiﬁable data with non-
NHS organisations is unlikely to be acceptable (how-
ever low their level of risk). Therefore some kind of
baseline technical de-identiﬁcation (probably pseudo-
nymisation) will usually be most cost-eﬀective or may
be a required minimum.
Beneﬁts
Low-risk recipients will no longer have to work with
less than pristine data. Any organisation, public, private
or otherwise has a route to data that is objective and
achievable depending only on their ability to demon-
strate an acceptably low privacy breach risk.
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Discussion
The origin of the reasoning presented in this paperwas
frustration at a data-sharing process that seems to
exclude all but government or academic bodies –
regardless of the risk of harm to a patient. This
seriously retards innovation. But how could one allow
a thousand ﬂowers to bloom and ‘open up’ evidence-
based health provision without an increase in privacy
breaches?
The answer seemed obvious. Understand thoroughly
where the potential harm comes from and create a
scalable system incentivised to relentlessly drive down
the factors responsible.
The fact that PIAG approval is still required even for
anonymous/pseudonymous data is evidence that they
acknowledge the data remains identiﬁable. Without
patient consent there is still an ethical need to husband
that data on behalf of the patient, i.e. anonymisation/
pseudonymisation of the data is not enough.
Adopting a privacy breach risk
approach
Were PIAG (or its successor bodies) to institute a
privacy breach risk approach to data sharing then these
limitations of scalability and unequal access would no
longer exist. PIAG or some other NHS honest broker
would set andmonitor acceptable risk levels,measure-
ment and mitigation standards applicable to NHS,
academia, commerce and other bodies. A variety of
public and private intermediaries would then ensure
implementation and compliance, much as ﬁnancial
auditors do today.
Data recipients would be incentivised to reduce
their breach risk because they would have to demon-
strate (via audit) an acceptable breach risk environ-
ment as a precondition to data access.
The public would be better reassured because at-
tention would be objectively focused on the risk of a
breach to their data, with market forces pushing that
risk down on a yearly basis.
Comparison with the literature
In the course of researching references for this paper
earlier work coming to broadly similar conclusions
was uncovered.
The Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act in the USA (HIPAA) Administrative
Simpliﬁcation provisions (published in 2006 with ref-
erences going back toDecember 2000) uses the risk of a
data recipient being able to identify an individual to
shape its conclusions.13 The main diﬀerence between
the HIPAA risk concept and those presented in this
paper is that HIPAA considers the identiﬁcation risk
inherent in the available data regardless of the recipient.
This paper argues that both data and recipient con-
tribute to the ability to identify data and as such both
need to be measured.
ISO 17799, a code of practice for information security
management, includes the concept of an organisation’s
‘risk appetite’ – the amount of acceptable risk. When
confronted with a risk an organisation has four choices;
accept the risk, mitigate it, avoid it (stop doing the
work) or transfer it to a partner (via insurance). This
risk approach is straight forward. Each risk is examined
individually and acted upon. The framework presented
in this paper is also risk based but is a product of less
room for manoeuvre. When sharing health data it is
usually not acceptable (or legal) to simply accept the
risk of a breach, not sharing is ruled out by deﬁnition
and legally the responsibility for preventing a breach
can not be transferred away from theDataGuardian.14
This leaves mitigating the breach risk as the only course
of action. As has been argued, perfectmitigation is not
possible which means the risk needs to be assessed to
be proportionately addressed, hence the need for this
framework.
In December 2007 the UK Information Commis-
sioner’s Oﬃce launched a Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA), a management tool used to identify and examine
risks and issues from the perspectives of all stake-
holders and then search for away to avoid orminimise
privacy concerns.15 The PIA seeks tominimise privacy
concerns by applying appropriate best practices. In
contrast the risk-based data-sharing framework de-
scribed in this paper guarantees an acceptably low
level of privacy risk because that is what is measured.
Of course until you can measure the breach risk of a
data-sharing scenario the best you can do is apply
something like the PIA.
Researchers in health care need to access patient
data for epidemiological study and to identify people
whomight be eligible to take part in research.Much of
the medical literature on information security has
focused on technical processes; the role of profession-
alism within health informatics is at best emergent.16
A conference and workshop set out the issues17 and
subsequently a further conference and workshop have
sought to achieve consensus as to how and when indi-
vidual patient consent should be sought. An interim
review of the latter is published within this journal.18
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Conclusion
A scientiﬁc approach to sharing private data therefore
depends upon being able to measure the combined
breach risk of; (1) a dataset and (2) the recipient who
will be processing it. This will draw on interdiscip-
linary knowledge from probability theory, statistical
disclosure control and operational risk measurement.
Quantitative assessmentofprivacybreach risks is achiev-
able and is the appropriate framework for sharing
patient data when getting their consent is not possible.
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